Here's another knowledgeable view of what we are up against that I received
a couple of days ago. I realize it is long but it puts a lot of things into
perspective.
Wes
From: "Greg Gosar"
Date: Friday, October 5, 2001 11:31 AM
To: "Gary Heiner" >
Subject: Letter(long) on Afghanistan Issues
> This is pretty well written. I don't agree with it totally, but it does
> provoke some thinking about what may be to come in the future as we get
>into the Afghanistan part of the terrorist problem:
> This was written by a West Point grad to members of his class. He spent a
> lot of time in Afghanistan and has some very definite ideas about how we
> should address the challenge over there. Lets hope that someone in the
> Pentagon and State Dept. factors this into the planning process. You
> might give this a boost into the right intellectual areas.
>
> Dave
>
> Dear Classmates:
>
> Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American
> citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first
> there in 1993 providing relief and assistance to refugees along the
> Tajik border and in this capacity have traveled all along the border
> region between the two countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was the Deputy
> Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This
> program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000
> persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat
> ironically engaged in a "Holy War" as decreed by the Taliban, against
> the evil of land mines, and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar,
> all those who might have died in this effort were considered to
> "martyrs" even an "infidel" like myself. The mine action program is the
> most respected relief effort in the country and because of this I had
> the opportunity to travel extensively, without too much interference or
> restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the
> Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject.
>
> I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but
> quite frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and
> have not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would
> like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations. First, he is
> absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I
> want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some comments
> about our "enemy." Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The
> country is devastated beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast
> majority of the people live day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject
> conditions of poverty, misery and deprivation. Less than 30% of the men
> are literate, the women even less. The country is exhausted, and
> desperately wants something like peace. They know very little of the
> world at large, and have no access to information or knowledge that
> would counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They have
> nothing left, nothing that is except for their pride.
>
> Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often
> referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious
> leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan
> contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war
> against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with
> assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred
> to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in
> more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war
> against the former Mujehdeen. Over time this military support along with
> financial support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant
> government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of
> Taliban armed forces, his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he
> has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed
> to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do
> that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar. This
> high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or
> so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the
> local Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has
> started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local
> humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions
> have become even harsher. It is my assessment that most Afghans no
> longer support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very
> difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely
> more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or
> from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action were probably on
> their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside
> doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan-defeat and dismemberment.
>
> During the Afghan war with the Soviets much attention was paid to the
> martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time
> and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would
> all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle
> against the Soviets. Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The
> Afghans, while never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in
> battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and
> light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural
> constraints that no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor.
> Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful (but still
> done). Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in
> nature, with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander" and this person
> owing allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is
> secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this
> somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they
> are being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong loyalties
> along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the concept of having a place of
> "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between
> families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual
> slight.
>
> That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the
> Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large
> bunch of Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have
> come out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot
> different from our fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of
> Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen group, another
> group-supposedly on the same side, attacked the first group and stole
> the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them, but because
> having them was a matter of prestige. Many larger coordinated attacks
> that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan
> fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or
> overwatch) and instead would join the
> assault group in order to seek glory. In comparison to Vietnam, the
> intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were lower for all
> involved.
>
> As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not
> THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less
> so than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been
> conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their
> history the only events that have managed to form any semblance of unity
> among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And in
> doing this the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest
> military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in all
> probability, kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the
> most elite military units. The physical difficulties of fighting in
> Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather and the harshness are all weapons
> that our enemies will use to their advantage and use well. (NOTE: For
> you military planner types and armchair generals--around November 1st
> most road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads used by
> the Russians have been destroyed and air movement will be problematic at
> best). Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others
> do not think the US has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed
> after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming
> consensus was that we were cowards, who would not risk one life in face
> to face combat. Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a
> deterrent, that action and others of the not so recent past, have
> reinforced the perception that the US does not have any "will" and that
> were are morally and spiritually corrupt.
>
> Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their
> propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the
> extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to
> fight coordinated battles and their lack of external support. More
> importantly though is that we have to take steps not to play to their
> strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by
> increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down
> trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up
> and down mountain valleys.
>
> I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and
> well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second
> guess current plans or start an academic debate I would share the
> following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans. First, I
> would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy
> off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this
> cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership making
> it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing
> discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military
> assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine
> its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans. Fourth would be to give
> massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in
> Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a
> reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation or
> dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works
> projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are
> much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that
> improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider vary carefully
> putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the
> females of our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to
> fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the
> cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights
> with women.
>
> I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the near term,
> keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter,
> allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban
> that were already developing. Expect that they will quickly turn on
> themselves and on OBL. We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the
> summer after. When we do "pick-up" the pieces I would make sure that we
> do so on the ground, "man to man."
>
> While I would never want to advocate American causalities, it is
> essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can
> and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned
> above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry
> operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses
> after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies
> regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this
> except for ground combat. And once this is all over, unlike in 1989 the
> US must provide continued long-term economic assistance to rebuild the
> country.
>
> While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to
> share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not
> abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there
> is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner
> exchange.
>
> During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist
> prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade"
> in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take
> home with them. This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and
> Chechnya were similar videos are being made today and can be found on
> the web for those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated
> the same way. Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos
> of US prisoners having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not
> only to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to
> cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian
> populations and to turn this into the world wide religious war that they
> desperately want. This will be a test of our will and of our character.
> (For further collaboration of this type of activity please read
> Kipling).
>
> This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and
> somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our
> enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of
> our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our
> enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during
> war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there
> are many, but for shrewd military logic.
>
> For anyone who is still reading this way to long note, thanks for your
> patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more
> concise manner.
>
> Thanks, Richard Kidd
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