I think we're both right about rationalization -- it's a two-edged sword.
As for using components shared with more common cars, that's a feature that
I still find attractive when I go to buy parts for a 22-year-old LBC.
Unfortunately, the history of BPL is full of cars that were rationalized
out of production -- such as the Big Healey (whose engine was going away) --
or cars for whom rationalization meant the use of really substandard parts
(the MGC, intended as a replacement for the Big Healey, but which was
saddled with an engine of lower output, greater weight, and less sporting
character altogether).
The fear of rollover laws are also what's primarily wrong with the X 1/9.
Specifically, a rumored US rollover-protection law caused Fiat to build
the X 1/9 about 300 lb heavier than they had intended, because at the
time there was also fear for a 35-mph impact law. The X 1/9 would have
passed this law that never was, but imagine what a car that would be with
300 fewer pounds to lug around.
Finally, the TR8 is perhaps the fitting choice for the last BL sports car.
It's everything that was great and everything that was horribly wrong, all
rolled into one vehicle. Great performance, a smooth V8 that Americans
still love in the Range Rover, in what should have been a proven chassis.
Horrible: making the customers do the alpha-test work on quality, taking
too long to come to market, and taking resources from a line that was
selling to try to promote a line that was not selling.
British automotive historian Wilson McComb tells the story thus:
"At first the TR7 seemed to be a success; the seasonal increase in
US sales that springtime saw M.G. outsrtipped by Triumph, which reached
a peak of 3500 cars sold during the month of June 1975. But this early
promise was not maintained. Even without the GT, Abingdon gradually
pulled ahead again in America, selling 3650 M.G.s in June 1976. Leyland's
reaction was a substantial cut in the dollar price of the TR7, which
briefly reversed the downward trend in Triumph sales and brought them up
to equal M.G.'s previous peak in March 1977. But M.G. overtook their
rival yet again, with a total of 4828 cars sold in May 1977, and comfort-
ably regained their position as the leading British [Phlegmsucking-sf]
Leyland marque on the American market, outselling all the others put
together -- Triumph, Jaguar, and Austin." [MG by McComb, p. 230]
These figures, McComb goes on to say, have never to his knowledge been
published in Britain, and come from Automotive News. He goes on in a
later section to add:
"Another American source (completely reliable, but it would be
tactless to name it) provides the following breakdown of BL sports
car sales in that country during 1977: MGB - 35.1%, Triumph TR7 - 28.1%,
M.G. Midget - 19.3%, Triumph Spitfire - 14.0%, Triumph TR6 - 3.5%."
I also talked about BL's continued underestimation of the US as an
important -- in fact, the most important -- export market. Sales
and production figures from the Abingdon factory from 1945 through 1977
are interesting. Two notes for a chart of annual production of M.G.s:
"5. The grand total of M.G.s built at Abingdon, 1945-1977 inclusive,
is 854,938. Of these cars, 664,851 have been exported.
6. The grand total of sports cars built at Abingdon over the same
period is 994,183. Of these, 815,969 have been exported,
659,445 of them to the USA." [McComb, ibid., p. 294]
Based on an analysis of the sales figures and customer buying trends,
it's pretty obvious that British Leyland not only knew nothing about
sports cars, they knew nothing about business by the late Seventies
either.
British Leyland deserved to die a horrible death. It's a shame they
had to take Triumph and M.G. -- which were together responsible for
94% of the U.S. market in 1977 [ibid.] -- with them.
--Scott "Yeah, let's DEFINITELY get Lotus on the flipping list" Fisher
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